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“There’s Voices in the Night Trying to 
Be Heard” 
THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE CONVENTION ON 
THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES ON 
DOMESTIC MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 
Michael L. Perlin† & Naomi M. Weinstein†† 
INTRODUCTION 
We cannot consider the impact of anti-discrimination law 
on persons with mental disabilities without a full understanding 
of how sanism1 permeates all aspects of the legal system—in 
judicial opinions, legislation, the role of lawyers, juror decision-
making—and the entire fabric of American society.2 
Notwithstanding nearly thirty years of experience under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act,3 and an impressive corpus of 
constitutional case law and state statutes,4 the attitudes of 
judges, jurors, and lawyers often reflect the same level of bigotry 
 
 † Adjunct Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law; Instructor, 
Loyola University New Orleans, Department of Criminology and Justice; Professor 
Emeritus of Law and Founding Director, International Mental Disability Law Reform 
Project, New York Law School. Co-founder, Mental Disability Law and Policy Associates. 
J.D., Columbia University, 1969; A.B., Rutgers University, 1966. The authors wish to 
thank Rachel Hisler for her excellent research assistance.  
 †† Associate Attorney, Mental Hygiene Legal Service. J.D., New York Law 
School, 2010; B.A., Tufts University, 2006. The views expressed in this article are of the 
authors and may not be representative of those of the Mental Hygiene Legal Service. 
 1 See infra text accompanying notes 41–54 for definition and explanation. 
 2 In this article, we also will make reference to Canadian developments, which 
parallel U.S. developments in many important ways, but diverge in others. 
 3 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (1990). 
 4 See Michael L. Perlin, “They Keep It All Hid”: The Ghettoization of Mental 
Disability Law and Its Implications for Legal Education, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 857, 857 
n.2 (2010) [hereinafter Perlin, “They Keep It All Hid”] (listing cases). For the Canadian 
and Australian perspectives, see Ravi Malhotra, The Implications of the Social Model of 
Disablement for the Legal Regulation of the Modern Workplace in Canada and the 
United States, 33 MANITOBA L.J. 1, 25 (2009) [hereinafter Malhotra (listing cases). See 
generally Ron McCallum & Hannah Martin, A Forgotten Cohort: Citizenship through 
Work and Persons with Disabilities, 41 QUEEN’S L.J. 317 (2016). 
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that defined this area of law a half century ago.5 The reasons for 
this are complex and, to a great extent, flow from centuries of 
prejudice—often hidden and socially acceptable prejudice6—that 
has persisted in spite of prophylactic legislative and judicial 
reforms, and a seemingly (on the surface) significant uptick in 
public awareness.7 One of the co-authors has railed multiple 
times about the “irrational,” “corrosive,” “malignant,” 
“pervasive,” “vicious,” and “ravaging” effects of sanism, but its 
“pernicious power” still poisons all of mental disability law.8 And 
scholars in other disciplines are now exploring the impact of that 
poison on daily social interactions as well.9  
 5 See generally Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: 
Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, Lepers 
and Crooks] (discussing how sanism affects all participants in the judicial system). 
 6 See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL 
DISABILITY ON TRIAL (2000) (explaining why this prejudice is often hidden from view). 
 7 On how an awareness of the power of sanism is necessary in any 
consideration of any aspect of the mental disability law system, see Perlin, “They Keep It 
All Hid”, supra note 4, at 860–61. 
 8 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won’t Even Say 
What It Is I’ve Got”: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment 
Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 750 (2005) [hereinafter Perlin, Best Friend] (“irrational”); 
Michael L. Perlin, “Life Is In Mirrors, Death Disappears”: Giving Life to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. 
REV. 315, 346 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, Life Is In Mirrors] (“ravaging”); Michael L. Perlin, 
“She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl”: Neonaticide, the Insanity Defense, and the Irrelevance 
of “Ordinary Common Sense,” 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 25 (2003) [hereinafter 
Perlin, She Breaks] (“malignant and corrosive”); Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, 
“Tolling for the Aching Ones Whose Wounds Cannot Be Nursed”: The Marginalization of 
Racial Minorities and Women in Institutional Mental Disability Law Policing Rape 
Complaints, J. GENDER, RACE & JUST., Summer 2017, at 431, 451 [hereinafter Perlin & 
Cucolo, Tolling for the Aching Ones] (“malignant and corrosive”); Michael L. Perlin, 
“Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain”: Considering the Sexual Autonomy 
Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and 
in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481, 502 (2008) [hereinafter Perlin, Making Love] (“corrosive”); 
Michael L. Perlin, “Things Have Changed”: Looking at Non-institutional Mental Disability 
Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 541 (2002) [hereinafter Perlin, 
Things Have Changed] (“pernicious power”); Michael L. Perlin, “God Said to Abraham/Kill 
Me a Son”: Why the Insanity Defense and the Incompetency Status are Compatible with and 
Required by the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Basic Principles 
of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 477, 510 (2017) [hereinafter Perlin, 
God Said] (“vicious”); Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “Mr. Bad Example”: Why 
Lawyers Need to Embrace Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Root out Sanism in the 
Representation of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 16 WYO. L. REV. 299, 306 (2016) 
[hereinafter Perlin & Lynch, Mr. Bad Example] (“pervasive stigma”). On the “corrosive” 
impact of sanism on criminal sentencing of defendants with post-traumatic stress disorder, 
see Michael L. Perlin, “I Expected It to Happen/I Knew He’d Lost Control”: The Impact of 
PTSD on Criminal Sentencing after the Promulgation of DSM-5, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 881, 
887–88 (2015). On its “corrosive” impact on the entire criminal trial process, see Michael L. 
Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, “You Might Have Drugs at Your Command”: Reconsidering 
the Forced Drugging of Incompetent Pre-trial Detainees from the Perspectives of 
International Human Rights and Income Inequality, 8 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 381, 395 
(2015) [hereinafter Perlin & Schriver, Drugs at Your Command]. 
 9 See, e.g., Greg Procknow, Silence or Sanism: A Review of the Dearth of 
Discussions on Mental Illness in Adult Education, 29 NEW HORIZONS ADULT EDUC. & HUM. 
RESOURCE DEV. 6–7 (2017); Stephanie LeBlanc & Elizabeth Anne Kinsella, Toward 
Epistemic Justice: A Critically Reflexive Examination of ‘Sanism’ and Implications for 
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Certainly, the passage of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA) in 199010—far and away the broadest anti-
discrimination law ever enacted on behalf of this population—gave 
great hope at that time. Commentators then raved about its 
“breathtaking promise”11 and characterized it as “the most 
important civil rights act passed since 1964,”12 and the 
“Emancipation Proclamation for those with disabilities.”13 It was, 
or so many of us thought, “without question, Congress’ most 
innovative attempt to address the pervasive problems of 
discrimination against citizens with physical and mental 
disabilities by providing, in the words of a congressional committee, 
‘a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination 
[of] discrimination against individuals with disabilities.’”14 
We remain generally optimistic, though our optimism has 
been somewhat tempered both by subsequent court decisions15 
 
Knowledge Generation, 10 STUD. SOC JUST. 59 (2016); Tonette S. Rocco, Sanism, Black Dogs 
Barking, and Mental Illness, 29 NEW HORIZONS ADULT EDUC. & HUM. RESOURCE DEV. 1, 1–2 
(2017); MAD MATTERS: A CRITICAL READER IN CANADIAN MAD STUDIES (Brenda A. LeFrançois, 
Robert Menzies & Geoffrey Reaume eds., 2013); Jennifer Poole et al., Sanism, ‘Mental Health,’ 
and Social Work/Education: A Review and Call to Action, 1 INTERSECTIONALITIES 20, 21 
(2012); Marina Morrow & Julia Weisser, Towards a Social Justice Framework of Mental 
Health Recovery, 6 STUD. SOC JUST. 27, 28 (2012); Essya M. Nabbali, A “Mad” Critique of the 
Social Model of Disability, 9 INT’L J. DIVERSITY IN ORGAN., COMMUNITIES & NATIONS 1 (2009); 
Brenda A. LeFrancois & Vicki Coppock, Psychiatrist Children and Their Rights: Starting the 
Conversation, 28 CHILD. & SOC’Y 165, 166 (2014); PhebeAnn M. Wolframe, The Madwoman 
in the Academy, or, Revealing the Invisible Straightjacket: Theorizing and Teaching Saneism 
and Sane Privilege, 33 DISAB. STUD. Q. NO. 1 (2012); for recent considerations of sanism in a 
variety of social policy contexts, see generally CRITICAL INQUIRIES FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE IN 
MENTAL HEALTH (Marina Morrow & Lorraine Halinka Malcoe eds., 2017). 
 10 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
 11 Bonnie Milstein et al., The Americans With Disabilities Act: A Breathtaking 
Promise for Persons with Mental Disabilities, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1240, 1240 (1991). 
 12 Kimberly A. Ackourey, Insuring Americans With Disabilities: How Far Can 
Congress Go To Protect Traditional Practices?, 40 EMORY L.J. 1183, 1183 n.1 (1991) 
(quoting Kent Jenkins, Jr., Spotlight Finds Hoyer, WASH. POST (May 28, 1990)). 
 13 Id. (quoting AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990: SUMMARY AND 
ANALYSIS, SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT (BNA), at S-5). 
 14 Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact of the ADA on the 
Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193, 
218–19 (2000), (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 1, at 3 (1990)). The United States is not 
the only nation to have passed such anti-discrimination legislation. By way of example, the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was amended in 1981 so as to include, as a 
protected category, persons with physical and mental disability. Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, sec. 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act, 1982, c 11 (UK), 1982. For an evaluation of the similarities and differences in the two 
nations’ laws, see Arlene S. Kanter, A Comparative View of Equality under the UN Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Disability Laws of the United States and 
Canada, 32 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST., no. 2, 2015, at 65, 88–89 (2015). 
 15 The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) was enacted expressly to 
legislatively overrule the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
527 U.S. 471 (1999), and Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), 
by expanding the statutory definition of “disability” within the ADA, and by seeking to 
reinvigorate “regarded as” prong in the ADA’s definition of disability. See ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 
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and by efforts in Congress to cut back on the scope of the ADA.16 
By example, the titles of some of the articles about the ADA by 
one of the co-authors and others reflect that diminution of 
optimism.17 Notwithstanding this, we believe that the ADA still 
can and must be relied upon as a source of rights for persons with 
mental disabilities in multiple discrete areas of law and policy.18 
At the time at which mental disability law scholars were 
beginning to focus on the ADA, few considered the dim-on-the-
horizon potential redemptive influence of international human 
rights law. Eric Rosenthal and Leonard Rubenstein had written 
 
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12103 and 12205a, amending 29 U.S.C. § 705, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101, 
12102, 12111 to 12114, 12201, and 12210, re-designating 42 U.S.C. §§ 12206 to 12213, 
and enacting provisions set out as notes under 29 U.S.C. § 705 and 42 U.S.C. § 12101.); 
see also MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL 
AND CRIMINAL, at § 11-4, at 11-124 to 11-125 (3d ed. 2018) [hereinafter PERLIN & 
CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW]. The ADA Amendments are discussed carefully in 
Paul A. Race & Seth M. Dornier, ADA Amendments Act of 2008: The Effect on Employers 
and Educators, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 357 (2009); Stephen Befort, Let’s Try this Again: 
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Attempts to Reinvigorate the ‘Regarded As’ Prong of 
the Statutory Definition of Disability, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 993 (2010). 
 16 See, e.g., Carlos Ballesteros, House Votes to Gut the Americans With Disabilities 
Act to Nip ‘Abusive Lawsuits,’ NEWSWEEK (Feb. 15, 2018), http://www.newsweek.com/house-
republicans-americans-disabilities-act-civil-rights-808106 [https://perma.cc/DS4D-SNCR]. 
 17 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: 
Can Sanist Attitudes Be Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15 (1993); Michael L. Perlin, “Make 
Promises by the Hour”: Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric Hospitalization, 46 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 947 (1997) [hereinafter Perlin, Make Promises]; Michael L. Perlin, “I Ain’t Gonna 
Work on Maggie’s Farm No More”: Institutional Segregation, Community Treatment, the 
ADA, and the Promise of Olmstead v. L.C., 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 53 (2000); Michael L. 
Perlin, “What’s Good Is Bad, What’s Bad Is Good, You’ll Find out When You Reach the Top, 
You’re on the Bottom”: Are the Americans with Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v. L.C.) 
Anything More than “Idiot Wind”?, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 235 (2002); Ali Abrar & Kerry 
J. Dingle, From Madness to Method: The Americans with Disabilities Act Meets the Internet, 
44 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 133, 133 (2009); Debbie N. Kaminer, Mentally Ill Employees in 
the Workplace: Does the ADA Amendments Act Provide Adequate Protection?, 26 HEALTH 
MATRIX 205, 205 (2016); Thomas J. Auner, For the Protection of Society’s Most Vulnerable, 
the ADA Should Apply to Arrests, 49 LOY. L.A. REV. 335, 335 (2016). 
 18 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “All His Sexless Patients”: 
Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257, 
297–99 (2014) [hereinafter Perlin & Lynch, Sexless Patients] (sexual autonomy); Michael 
L. Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein, “Friend to the Martyr, a Friend to the Woman of Shame”: 
Thinking About the Law, Shame and Humiliation, 24 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 30–
33 (2014) [hereinafter Perlin & Weinstein, Friend to the Martyr) (deinstitutionalization and 
community treatment); Naomi M. Weinstein & Michael L. Perlin, “Who’s Pretending to 
Care for Him?” How the Endless Jail-to-Hospital-to-Street-Repeat Cycle Deprives Persons 
with Mental Disabilities the Right to Continuity of Care, 8 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 455, 
457–58 (2018) (right to continuity of care); Perlin & Schriver, Drugs at Your Command, 
supra note 8, at 403; (availability of potential pre-trial alternatives in the case of currently-
incompetent criminal defendants). Similarly, Canadian scholars have critiqued the 
Supreme Court of Canada as remaining “remedially timid” in its interpretations of the 
Charter’s disability anti-discrimination provision. See Malhotra, supra note 4, at 27 
(quoting Dianne Pothier, Legal Developments in the Supreme Court of Canada Regarding 
Disability, in CRITICAL DISABILITY THEORY: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, POLICY AND 
LAW 316 (Dianne Pothier & Richard Devlin eds., 2006)). 
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their groundbreaking piece,19 International Human Rights Advocacy 
Under the “Principles For The Protection Of Persons With Mental 
Illness,”20 in 1993, but it had been barely mentioned in the law 
journals—only cited seven times prior to 2002.21 When Rosenthal 
and Rubenstein first illuminated how the United Nations’ Mental 
Illness (MI) Principles22—in many ways the forerunner of the United 
Nations’ Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD)—came “from an individualistic, libertarian perspective that 
emphasizes restrictions on what the state can do to a person with 
mental illness,”23 they inspired lawyers, advocates, professors, and 
progressive mental health professionals to begin thinking seriously 
about the intersection between international human rights law and 
mental disability law.24 
 
 19 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL 
DISABILITY LAW: WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD 3–19 (2012) [hereinafter PERLIN, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS]. 
 20 Eric Rosenthal & Leonard S. Rubenstein, International Human Rights 
Advocacy under the “Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness,” 16 INT’L 
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 257 (1993) [hereinafter Rosenthal & Rubenstein]. 
 21 Per WESTLAW search, Feb. 12, 2019. See Pamela Schwartz Cohen, 
Psychiatric Commitment in Japan: International Concern and Domestic Reform, 14 
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 28, 35 (1995); Norbert Gilmore, Drug Use and Human Rights: 
Privacy, Vulnerability, Disability, and Human Rights Infringements, 12 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 355 (1996); Arlene Kanter & Kristin Dadey, The Right to Asylum for 
People with Disabilities, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1117 (2000); Robin Munro, Judicial Psychiatry 
in China and Its Political Abuses, 14 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2000); Angelika C. Moncada, 
Involuntary Commitment and the Use of Seclusion and Restraint in Uruguay: A 
Comparison with the United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental 
Illness, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 589 (1994); Allyn R. Taylor, An International 
Regulatory Strategy for Global Tobacco Control, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 257 (1996); Allyn R. 
Taylor, Globalization and Biotechnology: UNESCO and an International Strategy to 
Advance Human Rights and Public Health, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 479 (1999). 
 22 The Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the 
Improvement of Mental Health Care are widely referred to as the “MI Principles.” See, 
e.g., Rosenthal & Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 259; see also G.A. Res. 46/119, annex, 
Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of 
Mental Health Care (Dec. 17, 1991).  
 23 Rosenthal & Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 260. The MI Principles subsequently 
became “the centrepiece of the human rights based approach to mental health care” in 
Australia. See Neil Rees, International Human Rights Obligations and Mental Health Review 
Tribunals, 10 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 33, 34–38 (2003); see also Terry Carney, Mental 
Health in Postmodern Society: Time for New Paradigms?, 10 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 12, 
14 (2003). Response to the Principles was not entirely positive. See, e.g., Tina Minkowitz, The 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Right to be Free 
from Nonconsensual Psychiatric Interventions, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 405, 407 
(2007) (criticizing MI Principles for not being sufficiently protective of the rights of persons 
with psychosocial disabilities, especially in the context of the right to refuse treatment); T.W. 
Harding, Human Rights Law in the Field of Mental Health: A Critical Review, 101 ACTA 
PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 24, 24 (2000) (discussing how MI Principles are “basically 
flawed,” also in the context of the right to refuse treatment). For a discussion of criticisms, see 
H. Archibald Kaiser, Canadian Mental Health Law: The Slow Process of Redirecting the Ship 
of State, 17 HEALTH L.J. 139, 160 (2009). 
 24 This led to a symposium at New York Law School in 2002 on International 
Human Rights Law and the Institutional Treatment of Persons with Mental Disabilities: 
The Case of Hungary, the first such program ever put on at any US-based law school. See 
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Disability rights took center stage at the United Nations 
in the most significant historical development in the recognition 
of the human rights of persons with mental disabilities: the 
drafting and adoption of a binding international disability rights 
convention.25 In late 2001, the United Nations General Assembly 
established an Ad Hoc Committee “to consider proposals for a 
comprehensive and integral international convention to promote 
and protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities.”26 
The Ad Hoc Committee drafted a document over the course of 
five years and eight sessions, and the new Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)27 was adopted in 
December 2006 and opened for signature in March 2007.28 It 
entered into force, thus becoming legally binding on State 
parties, on May 3, 2008, thirty days after the twentieth 
ratification.29 One of the hallmarks of the process that led to the 
 
Symposium, International Human Rights Law and the Institutional Treatment of Persons 
with Mental Disabilities: The Case of Hungary, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 340 
(2002). Presenters at this conference included Rosenthal, Krassimir Kanev, “a human 
rights advocate with the Bulgaria Helsinki Committee”, Gabor Gombos, head of the most 
important psychiatric survivor organization in Hungary, and Eva Szeli, then “Director of 
European Operations at MDRI’s Budapest office.” See id. at 346–48. Professor Szeli 
subsequently co-authored with the co-author of this article and three others the first 
casebook on the intersection between mental disability law and international human rights 
as well as other articles about the CRPD. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMPARATIVE MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
(2006); see also Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Mental Health Law and Human Rights: 
Evolution and Contemporary Challenges, in MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: VISION, 
PRAXIS, AND COURAGE 88 (Michael Dudley et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter Perlin & Szeli, 
Evolution and Contemporary Challenges]; Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Mental Health 
Law and Human Rights: Evolution, Challenges and the Promise of the New Convention, in 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 241 (Jukka Kumpuvuori & Martin Scheinin eds., 2010) 
[hereinafter Perlin & Szeli, Promise of the New Convention]. Major articles based on 
presentations at that conference include Eric Rosenthal & Clarence J. Sundram, 
International Human Rights in Mental Health Legislation, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 469 (2002), and Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Treatment of People 
with Mental Illness in Eastern Europe: Construing International Human Rights Law, 21 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 537 (2002). 
 25 On the singular role of this Convention, see Frederic Megret, The Disabilities 
Convention: Toward a Holistic Concept of Rights, 12 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 261 (2008); Frederic 
Megret, The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or 
Disability Rights?, 30 HUM. RIGHTS Q. 494 (2008) [hereinafter Megret, Disability Rights]; 
Perlin & Szeli, Evolution and Contemporary Challenges, supra note 24, at 81; Perlin & 
Szeli, Promise of the New Convention, supra note 24, at 243; Michael L. Perlin, “A Change 
Is Gonna Come”: The Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities for the Domestic Practice of Constitutional Mental Disability Law, 
29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483 (2009) [hereinafter Perlin, A Change is Gonna Come]. 
 26 G.A. Res. 56/168, ¶ 1 (Dec. 19, 2001). 
 27 G.A. Res. 61/106, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Dec. 
13, 2006) [hereinafter CRPD]. 
 28 Id. 
 29 On the twentieth ratification, see Press Release, With 20 Ratifications, 
Landmark Disability Treaty Set to Enter Into Force on 3 May, U.N. Press Release HR/4941 
(Apr. 3, 2008), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/hr4941.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/
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publication of the CRPD was the participation of persons with 
disabilities and the clarion cry, “Nothing about us, without us.”30 
This has led commentators to conclude that “the CRPD is 
regarded as having finally empowered the ‘world’s largest minority’ 
to claim their rights, and to participate in international and 
national affairs on an equal basis with others who have achieved 
specific treaty recognition and protection.”31 As we discuss,32 this 
Convention is the most revolutionary international human rights 
document ever ratified that applies to persons with disabilities.33 
Our hope is that the CRPD serves as a vehicle that will finally 
extinguish the toxic stench of sanism that permeates all levels of 
society.34 There is certainly precedent for international human 
rights treaties and conventions to be used in domestic courts.35  
C2RV-BKP5]; see Tara J. Melish, The UN Disability Convention: Historic Process, Strong 
Prospects, and Why the U.S. Should Ratify, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Jan. 2007, at 37, 44; Michael 
Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 
1126 (2007). As of the time of the preparation of this paper, 177 nations have ratified the 
Convention. U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-
rights-of-persons-with-disabilities.html [https://perma.cc/QH4S-9PBC]. 
 30 Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 n.15 
(2008) (“Statement by Hon Ruth Dyson, Minister for Disability Issues, New Zealand 
Mission to the UN, for Formal Ceremony at the Signing of the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disability, 30 March 2007: ‘Just as the Convention itself is the product 
of a remarkable partnership between governments and civil society, effective 
implementation will require a continuation of that partnership.’ The negotiating slogan 
‘Nothing about us without us’ was adopted by the International Disability Caucus.”). 
 31 Id. at 4. See generally Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Liberty and Security of 
the Person, in THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: A 
COMMENTARY 402 (Ilias Bantekas et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON UN 
CONVENTION] (discussing Article 14). 
 32 See infra text accompanying notes 83–146. 
 33 Perlin & Szeli, Evolution and Contemporary Challenges, supra note 24, at 
81; PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 19 , at 24. 
 34 “[T]he dynamics of sanism and pretextuality are a toxic combination that 
potentially weakens any enforcement opportunities of the CRPD.” Elayne E. Greenberg, 
Overcoming Our Global Disability in the Workforce: Mediating the Dream, 86 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 579, 593 (2012). 
“Pretextuality” means that courts regularly accept (either implicitly or explicitly) 
testimonial dishonesty, countenance liberty deprivations in disingenuous ways 
that bear little or no relationship to case law or to statutes and engage similarly 
in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decisionmaking, specifically where 
witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a “high propensity to purposely 
distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends.”  
PERLIN & CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 15, § 2-3, at 2-10 to 2-11(citing 
in part Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of “Ordinary 
Common Sense,” Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 133 (1991)). 
 35 See, e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980), aff ’d 
in part & rev’d in part, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing to the United Nations Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners in cases involving the “double bunking” of 
inmates). But see Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 257–59 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(holding United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) did not convey a 
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This article considers whether the CRPD, ratified or not, is 
likely to eradicate—or, at least, seriously reduce—domestic sanism. 
This article proceeds in the following parts. Part I discusses our 
sanist past, while Part II discusses our sanist present. Part III 
considers how the CRPD has the greatest potential for combating 
sanism and changing social attitudes. In doing so, this Part looks at 
five universal core factors that must be considered when evaluating 
the impact of the CRPD.36 Part IV draws on the tools of therapeutic 
jurisprudence when evaluating the impact of the CRPD.37 Finally, 
this article offers some brief and modest conclusions. 
The title of this paper comes from a song from Bob 
Dylan’s 1997 album, Time Out of Mind. The song—Million 
Miles38—has been termed by Dylan chronicler Oliver Trager as 
a “jaded, late-century, person-to-person confession of 
alienation,”39 and that is probably about right. The line that 
starts this paper, “There’s voices in the night trying to be heard,” 
reflects Dylan’s song-persona’s sense of loneliness as he sings 
“I’m tryin’ to get closer but I’m still a million miles from you.” 
We use it here, though, as a metaphor for the CRPD’s role in any 
inquiry into this aspect of disability law. Persons with 
disabilities—always marginalized, always ignored, always 
trivialized, all through sanism—have the “voices in the night 
trying to be heard.”40 Perhaps the CRPD will redemptively allow 
all of us to hear those voices. 
 
private right of action to plaintiffs as a matter of law). In at least one case, however, while 
noting that the non-ratified Convention was not binding on U.S. courts, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court “read the entire text of the convention, . . . [and in an adoption 
case] conclude[d] that the outcome of the proceedings in [that] case [were] completely in 
accord with principles expressed therein.” In re Adoption of Peggy, 767 N.E.2d 29, 37–38 
(Mass. 2002). See generally Perlin & Schriver, Drugs at Your Command, supra note 8, at 
387–88; Michael L. Perlin & Henry A. Dlugacz, “It’s Doom Alone That Counts’’: Can 
International Human Rights Law Be an Effective Source of Rights in Correctional 
Conditions Litigation?, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 675, 688–90 (2009). 
 36 See Perlin, A Change is Gonna Come, supra note 25, at 488. 
 37 “Therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model by which we can assess 
the ultimate impact of case law and legislation on mentally disabled individuals.” It 
requires (1) studying the role of the law as a therapeutic agent; (2) recognizing that 
substantive rules, legal procedures, and lawyers’ roles may have either therapeutic or 
anti-therapeutic consequences; and (3) questioning whether such rules, procedures, and 
roles can or should be reshaped so as to enhance their therapeutic potential, while not 
subordinating due-process principles. Perlin, She Breaks, supra note 8, at 30 n.233; see 
also infra text accompanying notes 188–223. 
39 Million Miles, Bob Dylan (1997), http://www.bobdylan.com/songs/million-miles 
[http://perma.cc/Z7RS-DS9K]. 
 39 OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN: THE DEFINITIVE BOB DYLAN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 429 (2004). 
 40 See, e.g., PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 19; see also 
RICHARD THOMAS, WHY BOB DYLAN MATTERS 188 (2017) (characterizing Million Miles 
as a song that “confront[s] love that is lost, but can’t be forgotten.”). 
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I. OUR SANIST PAST41 
Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and 
character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are 
reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, 
homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.42  
It permeates all aspects of mental disability law and affects all 
participants in the mental disability law system: litigants, fact 
finders, counsel, expert and lay witnesses.43 Its corrosive effects have 
warped mental disability law jurisprudence in involuntary civil 
commitment law, institutional law, tort law, and all aspects of the 
criminal process (pretrial, trial and sentencing).44 
It has affected us for generations, well before it was ever 
identified or named. 
Judges are not immune from sanism. “[E]mbedded in the 
cultural presuppositions that engulf us all,”45 judges take deeper 
refuge in heuristic thinking and flawed, non-reflective “ordinary 
common sense,” both of which continue the myths and stereotypes 
of sanism.46 They “reflect and project the conventional morality of 
the community,” and “judicial decisions in all areas of [civil and 
criminal] mental disability law continue to reflect and perpetuate 
sanist stereotypes.”47 Their language demonstrates bias against 
 
 41 This section was largely adapted from Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked 
Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability 
Law Developed as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 14–19 (1999). 
 42 See Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 374–75 (1992) 
[hereinafter Perlin, Sanism]. The classic study of these prejudices is GORDON W. 
ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 7, 14–15 (1954). 
 43 Michael L. Perlin, “His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill”: How Will 
Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 
885, 910 (2009). There is a robust literature about sanism in other nations as well. See, e.g., 
Lora Patton, “These Regulations Aren’t Just Here to Annoy You:” The Myth of Statutory 
Safeguards, Patient Rights and Charter Values in Ontario’s Mental Health System, 25 
WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 9, 22 (2008); H. Archibald Kaiser, Conway: A Bittersweet 
Victory for Not Criminally Responsible Accused, 75 C.R. 1–2(2010); Aaron A. Dhir, 
Relationships of Force: Reflections on Law, Psychiatry and Human Rights, 25 WINDSOR REV. 
LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 103, 108–09 (2008) [hereinafter Dhir, Relationships of Force]. 
 44 Perlin, Lepers and Crooks, supra note 5, at 684. 
 45 Anthony D’Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy, 32 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 329, 332 (1991). 
 46 Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: “Ordinary 
Common Sense” and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3, 67 (1990); Michael L. Perlin, 
Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last Frontier? 20 
NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517, 539 (1993–1994) (on how sanist myths pervade judicial 
decision making). The Supreme Court has been guilty of this behavior for over ninety 
years. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“[T]hree generations of imbeciles are 
enough”). For a refutation of Buck, see generally PAUL LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, 
NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL (2008). 
 47 See Perlin, Sanism, supra note 42, at 400–04. 
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individuals with mental disabilities48 and contempt for the mental 
health professions.49 “Courts often appear impatient with mentally 
disabled litigants, ascribing their problems in the legal process to 
weak character or poor resolve.”50 Thus, a popular sanist myth is 
that “[m]entally disabled individuals simply don’t try hard enough. 
They give in too easily to their basest instincts, and do not exercise 
appropriate self-restraint.”51 We assume that “[m]entally ill 
individuals are presumptively incompetent to participate in 
‘normal’ activities [and] to make autonomous decisions about their 
lives (especially in areas involving medical care).”52 
At its base, sanism is irrational.53 Any investigation of the 
roots or sources of mental disability jurisprudence must factor in 
society’s irrational mechanisms that govern our dealings with 
individuals with mental disabilities.54 The entire legal system 
 
 48 Although, in recent years, what was commonplace for decades—see Corn v. 
Zant, 708 F.2d 549, 569 (11th Cir. 1983) (defendant referred to as a “lunatic”); Sinclair 
v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting Shuler v. Wainwright, 491 
F.2d 1213, 1223 (5th Cir. 1974)) (using “lunatic”); Brown v. People, 134 N.E.2d 760, 762 
(Ill. 1956) (trial judge asked defendant, “You are not crazy at this time, are you?”); Pyle 
v. Boles, 250 F. Supp. 285, 288 n.3 (N.D. W. Va. 1966) (trial judge accused habeas 
petitioner of “being crazy”); cf. State v. Penner, 772 P.2d 819 (Kan. 1989) (unpublished 
disposition), at *3 (witnesses admonished not to refer to defendant as “crazy” or “nuts”)—
has largely abated, there are still some recent examples to consider, see, e.g., Carnegie 
v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (using “lunatic”); United States 
v. Garza, 751 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Even a mentally deranged defendant is 
out of luck if there is no indication that he failed to understand or assist in his criminal 
proceedings.”); see also Michelle Armstrong, Note, Addressing Defendants Who Are 
“Crazy, But Not Crazy Enough”: How Hall v. Florida Changes the Death Penalty for 
Mentally Ill Defendants, 47 U. TOL. L. REV. 743, 744–45 (2016). 
 49 See Commonwealth v. Musolino, 467 A.2d 605, 614 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) 
(reversible error for trial judge to refer to expert witnesses as “headshrinkers”). Compare 
State v. Percy, 507 A.2d 955, 956–57 n.1 (Vt. 1986) (reversing a conviction where 
prosecutor, in closing argument, referred to expert testimony as “psycho-babble”), with 
Commonwealth v. Cosme, 575 N.E.2d 726, 731 (Mass. 1991) (not error where prosecutor 
referred to defendant’s expert witnesses as “a little head specialist” and a “wizard”). See 
generally Douglas Mossman & Marshall B. Kapp, “Courtroom Whores”?—or Why Do 
Attorneys Call Us?: Findings from a Survey on Attorneys’ Use of Mental Health Experts, 
26 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 27, 27–28 (1998). 
 50 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of 
Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 670–71 (1993) [hereinafter Perlin, Pretexts]. 
 51 Perlin, On Sanism, supra note 42, at 396; see, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Rhetoric 
of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 238 (1990) (in the insanity defense trial of John W. 
Hinckley, charged with the attempted murder of then-President Ronald Reagan, the 
prosecutor suggested to jurors, “if Hinckley had emotional problems, they were largely 
his own fault”); see also State v. Duckworth, 496 So. 2d 624, 635 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (no 
error when juror who felt defendant would be responsible for actions as long as he 
“wanted to do them” not excused for cause). 
 52 Perlin, On Sanism, supra note 42, at 394. 
 53 See, e.g., Perlin, Lepers and Crooks, supra note 5, at 684. 
 54 See generally Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism 
Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. L. REV. 599 (1989) (discussing 
the idiosyncratic development of the insanity defense and the interplay of psychiatry, 
the law, and public notions of good versus evil that underlie empirical and social myths 
about persons with mental illness). 
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makes assumptions about persons with mental disabilities—who 
they are, how they got that way, what makes them different, what 
there is about them that lets us treat them differently, and whether 
their conditions are immutable.55 These assumptions reflect our 
fears and apprehensions about mental disability, persons with 
mental disability, and the possibility that we may become mentally 
disabled.56 We rarely ask the most important question of all:57 why 
do we feel the way we do about these people? 
Consider now the deleterious impact of sanism on mental 
disability law, especially institutional mental disability law. We 
must consider carefully five universal core factors that 
contaminate the practice and reality of mental disability law when 
evaluating the impact of sanism on international human rights, 
one of the main focuses of this paper.58 These core factors are: 
 
 55 See generally MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, 
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990) (exploring the historical sources of the ideas about 
difference resulting in contradictory legal strategies for persons with disabilities and 
arguing for jurisprudence based on the ability to recognize and work with perceptible forms 
of difference); SANDER GILMAN, DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY, 
RACE, AND MADNESS 19–35 (1985) (on the history of psychoanalysis and the stereotypes of 
persons with mental illness and sexuality using historical and literary examples). 
 56 See Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the “Insanity Defense”—Why Not?, 
72 Yale L.J. 853, 868–69 (1963); Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and 
Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 63, 93 n.174, 108 (1991) (on 
society’s fears of mentally disabled persons); id. at 93 n.174 (“[W]hile race and sex are 
immutable, we all can become mentally ill, homeless, or both. Perhaps this illuminates the 
level of virulence we experience here.”). On the way that public fears about the purported 
link between mental illness and dangerousness “drive the formal laws and policies” 
governing mental disability jurisprudence, see John Monahan, Mental Disorder and 
Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511, 511 (1992). 
 57 See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 6–
7 (1994) (asking this question); cf. Carmel Rogers, Proceedings Under the Mental Health 
Act 1992: The Legalisation of Psychiatry, 1994 N.Z. L.J. 404, 408 (1994) (“Because the 
preserve of psychiatry is populated by ‘the mad’ and ‘the loonies,’ we do not really want 
to look at it too closely—it is too frightening and maybe contaminating.”). On how sanism 
is more pernicious than stigma, see Matthew Large & Christopher J. Ryan, Sanism, 
Stigma and the Belief in Dangerousness, 46 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 1099, 1099–
1100 (2012). On how sanism may have permeated the profession and practice of social 
work, see Poole et al., supra note 9, at 24. On the role of the media in perpetuating such 
stigma, see generally Danielle Andrewartha, Words Will Never Hurt? Media 
Stigmatisation of People with Mental Illnesses in the Criminal Justice Context, 35 
ALTERNATIVE L.J. 4 (2010). On how it explains the “double standard[s]” present in much 
mental health legislation, see Christopher James Ryan, One Flu Over the Cuckoo’s Nest: 
Comparing Legislated Coercive Treatment for Mental Illness with that for Other Illness, 
8 J. BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 87, 87–88, 91 (2011). On how writers in other disciplines 
beyond law and psychology have begun to embrace the concept of sanism, see PERLIN & 
CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 15, § 2-2, at 2-10 n.52.1 (citing sources). 
 58 Perlin, A Change is Gonna Come, supra note 25, at 487. 
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1. Lack of comprehensive legislation to govern the commitment and 
treatment of persons with mental disabilities, and failure to adhere to 
legislative mandates.59 
2. Lack of independent counsel and lack of consistent judicial review 
mechanisms made available to persons facing commitment and those 
institutionalized.60 
3. Failure to provide humane care to institutionalized persons.61 
4. Lack of coherent and integrated community programs as an 
alternative to institutionalized care.62 
5. Failure to provide humane services to forensic patients.63 
Failure to consider these factors means that we are doomed to 
continue a sanist system that ignores the basic principles of 
international human rights law.64 
Sanism, along with pretextuality,65 has controlled and 
continues to control modern mental disability law. Just as 
importantly (perhaps, more importantly), these forces continue 
to exert this control invisibly.66 This invisibility means that the 
most important aspects of mental disability law—not just the 
law “on the books,” but, more importantly, the law in action and 
 
 59 Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights Law and Comparative Mental 
Disability Law: The Universal Factors, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 333, 337 (2007). 
 60 Id. at 340. 
 61 Id. at 343. 
 62 Id. at 349. 
 63 Id. at 354. 
 64 See generally PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 19. 
 65 “Pretextuality describes the ways in which courts accept testimonial 
dishonesty—especially by expert witnesses—and engage similarly in dishonest (and 
frequently meretricious) decision-making. It is especially poisonous where courts accept 
witness testimony that shows a ‘high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in 
order to achieve desired ends.” Perlin & Cucolo, Tolling for the Aching Ones, supra note 
8, at 452 (quoting Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, supra note 34, at 133); see also 
Michael L. Perlin, “Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror”: The Legal Profession’s Willful and 
Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 602 (2008): 
The pretexts of the forensic mental health system are reflected both in the 
testimony of forensic experts and in the decisions of legislators and fact-
finders. Experts frequently testify in accordance with their own self-referential 
concepts of “morality” and openly subvert statutory and case-law criteria that 
impose rigorous behavioral standards as predicates for commitment or that 
articulate functional standards as prerequisites for an incompetency-to-stand-
trial finding. Often this testimony is further warped by a heuristic bias. Expert 
witnesses—like the rest of us—succumb to the seductive allure of simplifying 
cognitive devices in their thinking and employ such heuristic gambits as the 
vividness effect or attribution theory in their testimony. 
See also PERLIN & CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 15, §§ 2-3 et seq. See 
generally Perlin, supra note 19, at 15. 
 66 Michael L. Perlin, “Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline”: Mental 
Disability Law, Theory and Practice, “Us” and “Them,” 31 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 775, 792 (1998).  
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practice—remains hidden from the public discussions about 
mental disability law. 
II. OUR SANIST PRESENT 
Although we are more aware now of the impact of sanism 
than we were forty-five years ago when it first emerged in the 
legal literature, it remains unclear whether the legal system has 
made the sort of structural changes needed to combat sanism’s 
power.67 We will consider one example of sanism to illustrate 
this: negative attitudes toward the sexual autonomy of persons 
with mental disabilities, especially those who are or who have 
been institutionalized.68 
The right to voluntary sexual interaction for persons with 
mental disabilities remains a controversial topic.69 This population 
faces a double set of conflicting prejudices: on the one hand, persons 
with disabilities are infantilized, and on the other hand, they are 
demonized as being hypersexualized.70 Notwithstanding the fact 
that the U.S. Supreme Court has implicitly recognized the right to 
sexual privacy in Lawrence v. Texas,71 U.S. law has paid very little 
attention to the legal rights of persons with disabilities to exercise 
their autonomy, especially in institutionalized settings.72 In striking 
down a Texas statute that criminalized certain intimate voluntary 
conduct engaged in by two persons of the same sex, the Court 
emphasized the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy 
of a person making intimate and personal choices.73 However, the 
Supreme Court has not directly addressed collateral sexual privacy 
rights, such as the individual right to purchase and use sexual aids, 
a question on which the federal courts have split.74 
 
 67 See Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on Its 
Development, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 97, 106–
07 (Frank J. Ayd, Jr. ed., 1974). 
 68 See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN & ALISON J. LYNCH, SEXUALITY, DISABILITY 
AND THE LAW: BEYOND THE LAST FRONTIER? (2016) [hereinafter PERLIN & LYNCH, 
SEXUALITY, DISABILITY AND THE LAW]. 
 69 Perlin, Making Love, supra note 8, at 483. 
 70 Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “Love is Just a Four-Letter Word”: 
Sexuality, International Human Rights, and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 CAN. J. COMP. 
& CONTEMP. L. 9, 10–11 (2015) [hereinafter Four-Letter Word]. 
 71 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 72 PERLIN & LYNCH, SEXUALITY, DISABILITY AND THE LAW, supra note 68, at 23. 
 73 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574. 
 74 Compare Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Alabama, 378 F.3d 1232, 1238, 1250 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (declining to extrapolate from dicta in Lawrence a right to sexual privacy triggering 
strict scrutiny in upholding a statutory ban on the sale of sexual devices), with Reliable 
Consultants v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 747 (5th Cir. 2008) (striking down statute criminalizing 
sale of sexual devices, finding that statute impermissibly burdened customer’s due process 
rights to engage in private intimate conduct). The authors discuss these collateral sexual 
privacy rights in Michael L. Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein, Said I, ‘But You Have No Choice’: 
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Sanism and pretexuality rob persons with mental 
disabilities of basic dignity and from exercising their right to 
sexuality in institutional settings.75 Compounding the issue is 
the fact that there is no standard to determine the competency 
required to engage in sexual interaction.76 At the most basic 
level, the test requires that an individual have the capacity to 
understand there is a decision to be made and have an ability to 
consent or not.77 
How does this relate to the CRPD? The CRPD guarantees 
a respect for dignity, the elimination of discrimination in all 
matters related to interpersonal relationships, and services in 
the area of sexual and reproductive health.78 “It is apparent that 
the preferences and decisions of persons with disabilities must 
be respected and promoted,” including decisions about sex, 
sexuality and reproduction, which is a “core element of self-
determination and empowerment.”79 
Beyond the right to sexual autonomy, the CRPD 
guarantees full access and participation for all persons with 
disabilities.80 In addition to the right to dignity and 
nondiscrimination, the CRPD also guarantees “[f]reedom from 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, . . . [f]reedom from exploitation, violence, and 
abuse,”81 and a right to protection of the “integrity of the person.”82 
Thus in ensuring that persons are free from humiliating and 
shaming sanctions,83 sanist attitudes are directly combatted. 
Nevertheless, sanism is not an issue that has gone away. 
Although, as we have noted already, it is recognized more and more 
 
Why a Lawyer Must Ethically Honor a Client’s Decision About Mental Health Treatment Even 
if It Is Not What S/he Would Have Chosen, 15 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 73, 108 
(2017) [hereinafter Perlin & Weinstein, But You Have No Choice]. 
 75 Perlin & Lynch, Sexless Patients, supra note 18, at 273. 
 76 To a significant extent, that is because of the fluidity of such a determination. 
Id. at 264; see also Michael L. Perlin et al., “Some Things are Too Hot to Touch”: 
Competency, the Right to Sexual Autonomy, and the Roles of Lawyers and Expert Witnesses, 
35 TOURO L. REV. 405 (2019). 
 77 Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexuality and Incapacity, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 
1217 (2015). 
 78 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 3, 23, 25. 
 79 Perlin & Lynch, Sexless Patients, supra note 18, at 277. 
 80 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 1. 
 81 Id. at art. 15–16. 
 82 Id. at art. 17. 
 83 Perlin & Weinstein, Friend to the Martyr, supra note 18, at 33. 
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by scholars84 and, more recently, by practitioners,85 it still remains 
“under the radar” for most courts in the United States.86 In fact, 
there are only a handful of court cases in the United States that even 
mention the term sanism.87 This is likely due to the fact that mental 
disability continues to be viewed as a hidden prejudice, one that is 
ignored by society, including the judicial system, in general.88 
III. THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES 
A. In General89 
We now turn to the Convention of the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD). The CRPD is unique because it is the 
first legally binding instrument devoted to the comprehensive 
protection of the rights of persons with disabilities. It not only 
clarifies that States should not discriminate against persons 
 
 84 See, e.g., Camille A. Nelson, Racializing Disability, Disabling Race: Policing 
Race And Mental Status, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 19 n.63 (2010); John W. Parry, The 
Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Lethal Dose of Stigma, Sanism, Fear 
of Violence, and Faulty Predictions of Dangerousness, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY 
L. REPORTER 667, 667 (2005); Deirdre M. Smith, The Disordered And Discredited Plaintiff: 
Psychiatric Evidence In Civil Litigation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 749, 809 n.329 (2010); Bruce 
J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental 
Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 847 (2009). A recent search of the Westlaw 
Law Reviews and Journals database found 200 references to “sanism” in articles other than 
those by the author (last searched Feb. 26, 2019). A similar search of the Westlaw 
International Materials Journals database found seven references to “sanism,” other than 
those by the author (last searched Feb. 25, 2019). 
 85 See, e.g., Bryan Lester Dupler, Capital Cases Involving Mental Retardation, 93 AM. 
JUR. TRIALS § 26, Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2019), (discussing sanism’s focus on the 
“characteristically irrational fear of feigned mental illness”); Gregory G. Sarno, Adequacy of 
Quasi-Miranda Warning Prior to Involuntary Civil Commitment, 40 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS, 
Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2019) (citing Perlin, Things Have Changed, supra note 8). 
 86 When one of the co-authors, Michael Perlin, does domestic presentations for 
forensic psychologists and/or forensic psychiatrists, the audience generally has some 
sense of what sanism is. When he spoke recently, however, to the annual conferences of 
both Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences and the American Society of Criminology, it 
was clear that it was fairly unknown to the audience. On the other hand, just about all 
in the audience were receptive and seemed to “get” the concept immediately. 
Interestingly, there has been intense interest in it on the part of advocates and mental 
health professionals in other nations, especially in Canada. See, e.g., Dhir, Relationships 
of Force, supra note 43, at 108; Mary Donnelly, Treatment for a Mental Disorder: The 
Mental Health Act 2001, Consent and the Role of Rights, 40 IRISH JURIST 220, 232, 249 
n.150 (2005); Kaiser, supra note 43; Oliver Lewis, Advancing Legal Capacity 
Jurisprudence, 6 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 700, 700–01 (2011); Morrow & Weisser, supra 
note 9, at 34; Nabbali, supra note 9; LeFrancois & Coppock, supra note 9, at 166; Patton, 
supra note 43, at 22; Poole et al., supra note 9, at 27. 
 87 A Westlaw search for all federal and state cases including the term “sanism” 
yielded only four results (last searched Apr. 6, 2019). 
 88 See Perlin, They Keep it All Hid, supra note 4, at 876. 
 89 This section is generally adapted from PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS, supra note 19, at Chapter 7. 
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with disabilities but also explicitly sets out the many steps that 
States must take to create an enabling environment so that 
persons with disabilities can enjoy authentic equality in 
society.90 There is no question that the CRPD has “ushered in a 
new era of disability rights policy.”91 
The CRPD furthers the human rights approach to disability 
and recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in 
almost every aspect of life.92 It firmly endorses a social model of 
disability—a clear and direct repudiation of the medical model that 
traditionally has been a part-and-parcel of mental disability law.93 
“The Convention responds to traditional models, situates disability 
within a social model framework94 and sketches the full range of 
human rights that apply to all human beings, all with a particular 
application to the lives of persons with disabilities.”95 It provides a 
 
 90 See COMMENTARY ON UN CONVENTION, supra note 31, at 94–98 (discussing 
each article); see also Bryan Y. Lee, The U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities and Its Impact upon Involuntary Civil Commitment of Individuals with 
Developmental Disabilities, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 393, 413–30 (2011) (discussing 
the changes that ratifying states need to make in their domestic involuntary civil 
commitment laws to comply with CRPD mandates). 
 91 Michael L. Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind”: 
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Future of 
Guardianship Law, 117 PA ST. L. REV. 1159, 1173–74 (2013) [hereinafter Perlin, Striking 
for the Guardians]; see also Kanter, supra note 14, at 76: 
[T]he CRPD challenges policy makers, scholars, advocates, and activists to 
reframe the meaning of equality and inclusion for people with disabilities by 
requiring States Parties to take affirmative steps to ensure equality for people 
with disabilities that go beyond traditional notions of equal treatment as well 
as equal opportunities, specifically in the employment context. 
 92 See, e.g., Aaron A. Dhir, Human Rights Treaty Drafting Through the Lens of 
Mental Disability: The Proposed International Convention on Protection and Promotion 
of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 181, 189–91 
(2005) [hereinafter Dhir, Human Rights]. 
 93 See generally Michael L. Perlin, “Abandoned Love”: The Impact of Wyatt v. 
Stickney on the Intersection Between International Human Rights and Domestic Mental 
Disability Law, 35 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 121, 127 (2011) (discussing the social model 
framework of the CRPD and how post Wyatt lawyers began to “replicate” the decision 
and transform mental disability law from medical to legal model). On the tension 
between the two models, see Piers Gooding, Supported Decision-Making: A Rights-Based 
Disability Concept and Its Implications for Mental Health Law, 20 PSYCHIATRY, 
PSYCHOL. & L. 431 (2013) [hereinafter Gooding, Supported Decision-Making]. On the 
ways that aspects of mental disability law were traditionally premised on a medical 
model, see Michael Waterstone, Returning Veterans and Disability Law, 85 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2010). On how the medical model “is in direct violation” of the CRPD, 
see Michael L. Perlin, Promoting Social Change in Asia and the Pacific: The Need for a 
Disability Rights Tribunal to Give Life to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1,14 (2012). 
 94 See, e.g., Janet E. Lord et al., Lessons from the Experience of U.N. Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Addressing the Democratic Deficit in Global 
Health Governance, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 564, 564 (2010); Kaiser, supra note 43. 
 95 Janet E. Lord & Michael Ashley Stein, Social Rights and the Relational 
Value of the Rights to Participate in Sport, Recreation, and Play, 27 B.U. INT’L L J. 249, 
256 (2009); see also Ronald McCallum, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
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framework for insuring that mental health laws “fully recognise 
the rights of those with mental illnesses.”96 
As we noted earlier, one of the core issues that must be 
confronted directly if we ever can meaningfully eradicate sanism is 
the lack of adequate, independent and dedicated counsel for 
individuals facing involuntary civil commitment.97 This remains 
one of the most critical issues in seeking to bring life to 
international human rights law in a mental disability law context. 
The CRPD mandates that “States Parties shall take appropriate 
measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the 
support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.”98 
Elsewhere, the convention commands: 
States Parties shall ensure effective access to justice for persons with 
disabilities on an equal basis with others, including through the 
provision of procedural and age-appropriate accommodations, in order 
to facilitate their effective role as direct and indirect participants, 
including as witnesses, in all legal proceedings, including at 
investigative and other preliminary stages.99 
The question remains: will this Article be honored in nations 
that have ratified the CRPD, and will it, authentically, have a 
major impact on the extent to which the entire CRPD affects 
the individuals in question.100 If and only if, there is a 
mechanism for the appointment of dedicated counsel,101 can this 
dream become a reality. 
The ratification of the CRPD is the most important 
development in institutional human rights law for persons with 
mental disabilities. The CRPD is detailed, comprehensive, 
 
Persons with Disabilities: Some Reflections (Mar. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1563883 [https://perma.cc/29V3-LDKN]. 
 96 Bernadette McSherry, International Trends in Mental Health Laws: 
Introduction, 26 LAW CONTEXT 1, 8 (2008). But see Kristen Booth Glen, Introducing a 
“New” Human Right: Learning from Others, Bringing Legal Capacity Home, COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV., Spring 2017, at 1, 36 (“[M]edical models still hold particular sway 
when it comes to psychosocial disabilities such as schizophrenia, depression, and bipolar 
disorder.”) (citing MENTAL HEALTH EUR., AUTONOMY, CHOICE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF 
SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING FOR PERSONS WITH PSYCHOSOCIAL DISABILITIES: MHE 
POSITION PAPER ON ARTICLE 12 UNCRPD ON LEGAL CAPACITY 5 (2017)). 
 97 Perlin, supra note 59, at 340–42. 
 98 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 12, ¶ 3. 
 99 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 13, ¶ 1. 
 100 Michael L. Perlin, “I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your Funeral, 
My Trial”: Global Clinical Legal Education and the Right to Counsel in Civil 
Commitment Cases, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241, 253 (2008). 
 101 On the significance of “cause lawyers” in the development of mental disability 
law in the United States, see Michael A. Stein et al., Cause Lawyering for People With 
Disabilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1658, 1661–62 (2010) (reviewing SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, 
LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2009)). 
890 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:3 
integrated and the result of a careful drafting process.102 It seeks to 
reverse the results of centuries of oppressive behavior and attitudes 
that have stigmatized persons with disabilities. Its goal is clear: “to 
promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with 
disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity.”103 
Whether this will actually happen is still far from a settled matter. 
The United States remains one of the lone members of 
the UN to have not yet ratified the CRPD.104 In December 2012, 
the ratification of the CRPD fell short by five votes, out of 
concerns that the CRPD would threaten national sovereignty.105 
One of the main arguments against ratification of the CRPD by 
Republican members of the Senate was that disability rights 
were already guaranteed by the ADA, the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and by the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act.106 Thus, by ratifying the CRPD, 
the United States would be exposing itself to risky international 
monitoring when these adequate protections were already in 
place.107 But this argument failed to acknowledge that a federalism 
reservation108 would have “alleviate[d] any national sovereignty 
concerns” by making it clear that the CRPD would not necessarily 
intrude upon domestic law.109 It also failed to recognize the 
 
 102 See HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABILITY ADVOCACY (Maya Sabatello & Marianne 
Schulze eds., 2014) (describing various perspectives on the involvement of civil society 
in the drafting of the Convention). 
 103 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 1. 
 104 CRPD and Optional Protocol Signatures and Ratifications, U.N. (May 2016), 
http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/2016/Map/DESA-Enable_4496R6_May16.pdf. 
For discussions of Canada’s ratification of the CRPD, see Ravi Malhotra & Robin F. 
Hansen, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 
Its Implications for the Equality Rights of Canadians with Disabilities: The Case of 
Education, 29 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 73, 83–90 (2011); Mona Paré, Of Minors and 
the Mentally Ill: Re-Positioning Perspectives on Consent to Health Care, 29 WINDSOR Y.B. 
ACCESS JUST. 107, 116–18 (2011). 
 105 LUISA BLANCHFIELD & CYNTHIA BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42749, 
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: 
ISSUES IN THE U.S. RATIFICATION DEBATE 1–8 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R42749.pdf [https://perma.cc/74EC-DNRX]. 
 106 Candace Farmer, Can the U.S. Use a Reservation to Alleviate Sovereignty 
Concerns Regarding the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities?, 43 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 249, 266–67 (2014). 
 107 See id. at 267. 
 108 A reservation is a “unilateral statement . . . made by a State . . . when 
signing . . . a treaty . . . whereby the State . . . purports to exclude or to modify the legal 
effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.” Id at 271 
(quoting Int’1 Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, 63d Sess. (2011), United Nations Guide 
to Practice on Reservations to Treaties). For the CRPD, the Obama Administration 
proposed a federalism reservation which stated that “US obligations under [the] CRPD 
are limited to those measures appropriate to the federal system, such as the enforcement 
of the [ADA].” BLANCHFIELD & BROWN, supra note 105, at 5. 
 109 Farmer, supra note 106, at 270. 
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shortcomings of the ADA110 and how the CRPD could be used “to 
expand the rights of people with disabilities beyond civil and 
political rights to economic, social, and cultural rights” beyond 
what is guaranteed or aspired to under domestic law.111 
Notwithstanding the fact that Congress has not yet ratified 
the CRPD, the fact that it was signed by President Obama in 2012 
means that the CRPD still has weight and influence over domestic 
policy.112 The signing of the Convention triggers the application of 
the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties “which requires 
signatories ‘to refrain from acts which would defeat the Disability 
Convention’s object and purpose.’”113 Importantly, New York state 
courts have relied on this and have cited the CRPD with approval 
in cases involving guardianship matters.114 
Surrogate Judge Kristen Booth Glen thus granted the 
CRPD “persuasive weight’ in interpreting our own laws and 
constitutional protections.”115 In a later decision, New York State 
Surrogate Judge Margarita Lopez Torres relied again on 
international human rights law (including the CRPD) in a 
decision that rejected a guardianship appointment petition, in a  
 110 See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from 
Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the 
Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 413–14 (1997) (arguing that “special 
treatment” approaches to interpreting the ADA have led to problems with enforcing the 
law); Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 102 (1999) (noting that courts’ refusal to defer, as required, 
to agency interpretations of the ADA led to a pro-defendant bias in litigation). 
 111 Arlene S. Kanter, The Americans with Disabilities Act at 25 Years: Lessons to 
Learn from the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 819, 
883 (2015). 
 112 See Michelle Diament, Obama Urges Senate to Ratify Disability Treaty, 
DISABILITY SCOOP (May 18, 2012), https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2012/05/18/obama-
urges-senate-treaty/15654/ [https://perma.cc/4FPN-X7ME]. Because the Senate lacked a 
super-majority of votes, it failed to ratify the CRPD on December 4, 2012. See The 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, U.S. INT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITIES, 
http://usicd.org/index.cfm/crpd [https://perma.cc/3MYQ-C9M2]. See generally Perlin & 
Schriver, Drugs at Your Command, supra note 8, at 387. 
 113 See In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 433 (Sur. Ct. 2010) (citing Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treatises art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331), as discussed 
in Henry Dlugacz & Christopher Wimmer, The Ethics of Representing Clients with Limited 
Competency in Guardianship Proceedings, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 331, 362–
63 (2011). 
 114 See, e.g., Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d at 435 (holding due process required that 
the guardianship appointment be subject to a requirement of periodic reporting and 
review); In re Guardianship of Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d 848, 854 (Sur. Ct. 2012) (holding 
that substantive due process requirement of adherence to principal of least restrictive 
alternative applied to guardianships sought for mentally persons). There is nothing new 
or radical about the use of international human rights law in U.S. courts. See generally 
Michael W. Lewis & Peter Margulies, Interpretations of IHL in Tribunals of the United 
States, in APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN JUDICIAL AND QUASI-
JUDICIAL BODIES 415 (Derek Jinks et al. eds., 2014) (demonstrating how U.S. courts have 
been interpreting international human rights law ever since the nation was founded). 
 115 Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d at 855; see Perlin, Striking for the Guardians, 
supra note 91, at 1178 n.97 (discussing Dameris L. in this context). 
892 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:3 
case of a woman with Down’s Syndrome living in the community. 
Concluded Judge Torres: 
The perfunctory appointment of a plenary guardian based upon 
medical certifications or diagnostic tests alone, without careful and 
meaningful inquiry into the individual’s functional capacity, relies 
upon the incorrect assumption that the mere status of intellectual 
disability provides sufficient basis to wholly remove an individual’s 
legal right to make decisions for himself. This approach is contrary to 
established conventions of international human rights.116 
Here, Judge Torres incorporated a state task force’s finding that 
“[c]ommunity integration includes the ability of people with 
disabilities to make their own choices to the maximum extent 
possible.” She added that “guardianship removes the legal 
decision-making authority of an individual with a disability and 
should . . . only be imposed if necessary and in the least restrictive 
manner,”117 relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s anti-institutional 
segregation ADA decision of Olmstead v. L.C.118 She also stressed 
that, in coming to her decision, she found the CRPD to provide 
“persuasive authority for the foundational premise that ‘persons 
with disabilities have a right to recognition everywhere as 
persons before the law’ and ‘persons with disabilities enjoy legal 
capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.’”119 
In an even more recent decision, another New York State 
Surrogate Court judge found that an indigent adult—subject to 
guardianship proceedings upon allegations of incapacitation—had a 
right to assigned counsel. The Court reasoned that her fundamental 
liberty interests—including the right to privacy, the right to 
determine her residence, and the right to decide on medical 
treatment—would be profoundly affected,120 especially given the fact 
that guardianship proceedings were of unlimited duration and 
scope, and had no provision for independent review or 
examination.121 In finding that individuals living with disabilities 
are no less entitled to these constitutional guarantees of due process 
than persons who are not alleged to be under disability, the court 
 
 116 In re Guardian of Michelle M., No. 2014, 2016 WL 3981204, at *3 (Sur. Ct. 2016); 
see generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 16, at §§ 2-8, 2-82–2-83. 
 117 Michelle M., 2016 WL 3981204, at *3. 
 118 Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 591–92 (1999) (state programs for persons 
with disabilities must be administered in the most integrated setting appropriate to the 
individual’s unique needs). On the relationship between the CRPD and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, see Kanter, supra note 14, at 80–85, and on the advantages of the 
human rights approach of the CRPD, see Kanter, supra note 111, at 823–24. 
 119 Michelle M., 2016 WL 3981204, at *3 (quoting CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 
12(1)-(2)). 
 120 In re Zhuo, 42 N.Y.S.3d 530, 532 (Sur. Ct. 2016). 
 121 Id. at 536. 
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pointedly added, “[p]ersons with disabilities have a right to 
recognition everywhere as persons before the law . . . [and] enjoy 
legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.”122 
Some argue that the enactment of the ADA made it 
unnecessary for the United States to ratify the CRPD.123 We 
reject that argument in toto. The ADA and the CRPD are neither 
identical nor are they mutually exclusive. Although the ADA has 
resulted in greater access to services, buildings, and programs 
for persons with disabilities in the United States, it has failed to 
live up to its goal of destroying the “wall of exclusion” for persons 
with disabilities.124 The CRPD goes further than the ADA in the 
protection of rights for persons with disabilities, to not just 
prohibit discrimination but to ensure substantive equality 
including civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights,125 
and by including prescriptive rights (“the right to”) as well as 
proscriptive rights (“the right to be free from”).126 
The CRPD categorically affirms the social model of 
disability127 by describing it as a condition arising from “interaction 
between persons with impairments and attitudinal and 
environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective 
participation in society on an equal basis with others” instead of 
inherent limitations.128 Further, it reconceptualizes mental health 
rights as disability rights,129 and extends existing human rights to 
take into account the specific experiences of persons with 
disabilities.130 To this end, it calls for “[r]espect for inherent 
 
 122 Id. at 532–33 (quoting CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 12(1)-(2)). The CRPD is 
also cited with approval in Proceeding for the Appointment of Guardian For Leon 
Pursuant to SCPA Article 17–A, 53 Misc.3d 1204(A), 43 N.Y.S. 3d 769 (Surrogate’s Ct. 
2016, at *1 (“Persons with disabilities have a right to recognition everywhere as persons 
before the law . . . [and] enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects 
of life.” (citing Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/611, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/611, art. 12 (Dec. 6, 2006))). 
 123 See BLANCHFIELD & BROWN, supra note 105, at 12. 
 124 Kanter, supra note 111, at 822. 
 125 Id. at 848–51. 
 126 See Perlin & Schriver, Drugs at Your Command, supra note 8, at 386; Robert 
J. Quinn, Will the Rule of Law End? Challenging Grants of Amnesty for the Human 
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime: Chile’s New Model, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 905, 920 
(1994) (noting the significance of the inclusion of proscriptive and prescriptive rights in 
human rights treaties in general); Gooding, Supported Decision-Making, supra note 93, 
at 434 (explaining how the CRPD combines these two categories of rights). 
 127 Lord et al., supra note 94, at 568. The CRPD has also been used as a basis 
for rethinking New York guardianships for persons with intellectual disabilities. See 
Karen Andreasian et al., Revisiting S.C.P.A. 17-A: Guardianship for People with 
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 18 CUNY L. REV. 287, 329–31 (2015). 
 128 CRPD, supra note 27, at pmbl. ¶ (e), art. 1. 
 129 Phillip Fennel, Human Rights, Bioethics, and Mental Disorder, 27 MED. & L. 
95, 106 (2008). 
 130 Megret, Disability Rights, supra note 25, at 504; see PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 143–55. 
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dignity”131 and “[n]on-discrimination.”132 As noted earlier, 
subsequent articles declare “[f]reedom from torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,”133 “[f]reedom 
from exploitation, violence and abuse,”134 the right to “liberty and 
security of the person,”135 and a right to protection of the “integrity 
of the person.”136 
B. Issues of Dignity137 
We must next consider the significance of dignity in its 
inquiry and its relationship to international human rights law.138 
When the United Nations embarked upon the drafting process 
of the CRPD, it established an ad hoc committee “to consider 
proposals for a comprehensive and integral international 
convention to promote and protect the rights and dignity of 
persons with disabilities.”139 This was consonant with the 
perspectives of observers such as Professor Aaron Dhir: 
“Degrading living conditions, coerced ‘treatment,’ scientific 
experimentation, seclusion, restraints—the list of violations to 
the dignity and autonomy of those diagnosed with mental 
disabilities is both long and egregious.”140 
As ratified, the CRPD calls for “[r]espect for inherent 
dignity.”141 It requires State parties “to adopt immediate, 
effective and appropriate measures . . . [t]o raise awareness 
throughout society, including at the family level, regarding 
persons with disabilities, and to foster respect for the rights and 
dignity of persons with disabilities.”142 The Preamble 
characterizes “discrimination against any person on the basis of 
disability [as] a violation of the inherent dignity and worth of the 
 
 131 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 3(a). 
 132 Id. at art. 3(b). 
 133 Id. at art. 15. 
 134 Id. at art. 16. 
 135 Id. at art. 14. 
 136 Id. at art. 17. On the possible application of these article to persons with 
mental disabilities in prison, see Perlin, God Said, supra note 8, at 486. 
 137 This section is generally adapted from PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS, supra note 19, at Chapter 2. 
 138 We know, by way of example, that “[p]erceptions of systemic fairness are 
driven, in large part, by ‘the degree to which people judge that they are treated with 
dignity and respect.’” Michael L. Perlin, “Who Will Judge the Many When the Game is 
Through?”: Considering the Profound Differences between Mental Health Courts and 
“Traditional” Involuntary Civil Commitment Courts, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 937, 955 
(2018) (quoting Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 415 (2000)). 
 139 G.A. Res. 56/168, at ¶ 1 (Feb. 26, 2002). 
 140 Dhir, Human Rights, supra note 92, at 182. 
 141 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 3(a). 
 142 Id. at art. 8. 
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human person.”143 And these provisions are consistent with the 
entire CRPD’s “rights-based approach focusing on individual 
dignity,”144 placing the responsibility on the State “to tackle 
socially created obstacles in order to ensure full respect for the 
dignity and equal rights of all persons.”145 
Professor Michael Stein puts it well this way: A “dignitary 
perspective compels societies to acknowledge that persons with 
disabilities are valuable because of their inherent human worth.”146 
In Professor Cees Maris’s summary: “The Convention’s object is to 
ensure disabled persons enjoy all human rights with dignity.”147 In 
his testimony in support of the CRPD, Eric Rosenthal, the director 
of Mental Disability Rights International, shared with Congress 
his observations of the treatment of institutionalized persons with 
mental disabilities in Central and Eastern European nations: 
“[w]hen governments deny their citizens basic human dignity and 
autonomy, when they subject them to extremes of suffering, when 
they segregate them from society-we call these violations of 
fundamental human rights.”148 
Dignity issues self-evidently affect institutionalization 
issues as well.149 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
has held that a state welfare department regulation requiring 
certain patients to receive services in the segregated setting of a 
nursing home, rather than in their own homes, violated the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In the course of its 
opinion, it read the ADA to intend to ensure that “qualified 
individuals receive services in a manner consistent with basic 
human dignity rather than a manner which shunts them aside, 
 
 143 Id. at pmbl ¶ (h). 
 144 Dhir, Human Rights, supra note 92, at 195. 
 145 GERARD QUINN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABILITY: THE CURRENT USE 
AND FUTURE POTENTIAL OF UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF DISABILITY 14 (2002). 
 146 Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL. L. REV. 75, 106 (2007). 
 147 Cees Maris, A ≠ A: Or, Freaky Justice, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1133, 1156 (2010). 
 148 Sally Chaffin, Challenging the United States Position on a United Nations 
Convention on Disability, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 121, 140 (2005) (alteration 
in original) (quoting International Disability Rights: The Proposed UN Convention: 
Hearing before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, 108th Cong. (Mar. 30, 2004)). 
 149 See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008), for the role of dignity in 
the criminal trial process in cases involving criminal defendants with mental disabilities, 
as discussed in PERLIN & CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 15, § 13-3-2.4. 
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hides, and ignores them.”150 Importantly, such values have been 
affirmed in other nations as well.151 
Further, the human rights approach embodied in the 
CRPD promotes a basis for intervention that is more care-
oriented152 rather than the violence-preventative basis that now 
exists in the United States and elsewhere in the world.153 “Waiting 
for treatment until persons are deemed a danger of violence to 
themselves or others is a denial of human dignity.”154 Any 
intervention must be the least restrictive, must take into account 
the person’s preferences,155 and must ensure that any potential 
trauma be diminished.156 
Dignity means that people “possess an intrinsic worth 
that should be recognized and respected, and that they should 
not be subjected to treatment by the state that is inconsistent 
with their intrinsic worth.”157 There are four principles that can 
strengthen the application of dignity in judicial decisions: 
 
 150 Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 327, 335 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Michael L. 
Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, “Is It More Than Dodging Lions and Wastin’ Time”? 
Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the Judicial Process in Individual 
Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 114, 118–19, 132 (1996) 
(on how hearings in right to refuse treatment cases can enhance dignity values); Perlin, 
Make Promises, supra note 17, at 961–62 (on the ADA and dignity in general). 
 151 Courts in Canada have similarly stressed the role of dignitarian values in 
cases involving the autonomy of persons with mental disabilities: “Mentally ill persons 
are not to be stigmatized because of the nature of their illness or disability; nor should 
they be treated as persons of lesser status or dignity. Their right to personal autonomy 
and self-determination is no less significant, and is entitled to no less protection . . . .” 
Fleming v. Reid [1991], 4 O.R. 3d 74, 86–87 (Can. Ont. C.A.); see also Dhir, Relationship 
of Force, supra note 43, at 109 (discussing Fleming). Professor Malhotra has a less 
sanguine view of other Canadian cases. See, e.g., Malhotra, supra note 4, at 29 (stating 
Canada Supreme Court disability rights decisions in Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703, 2000 SCC 28 (QL), and in Auton v. 
British Columbia, 2004 SCC 78, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657, were “problematic decisions with 
negative impacts for persons with disabilities”). On the role of Canadian provincial 
legislatures in matters involving the rights of persons subject to the civil commitment 
process, see Isabel Grant & Peter J. Carver, PS v Ontario: Rethinking the Role of the 
Charter in Civil Commitment, 53 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 999, 1031 (2016) (“[D]oing nothing 
is the more likely response of most provincial legislators, as the rights of civilly detained 
individuals have rarely been given priority.”). 
 152 On how the CRPD may be used as a vehicle to promote continuity of care for 
persons with mental disabilities, see Weinstein & Perlin, supra note 18. 
 153 Jonathan Simon & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Dignifying Madness: Rethinking 
Commitment Law in an Age of Mass Incarceration, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 40 (2015). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 41. 
 156 See, e.g., Mehgan Gallagher & Michael L. Perlin, “The Pain I Rise Above”: 
How International Human Rights Can Best Realize the Needs of Persons with Trauma-
Related Mental Disabilities, 29 FLA. J. INT’L L. 271 (2017). 
 157 Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and 
the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 415 (2009) (quoting Gerald Neuman, 
Human Dignity in the United States Constitution, in ZUR AUTONOMIE DES INDIVIDUUMS 
250 (Dieter Simon & Manfred Weiss eds., 2000)). Although some “[c]ritics dismiss dignity 
as a legal concept on the ground that it is too indeterminate and subjective to provide 
judgments or even guidance to judges and other legal interpreters,” Simon & 
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(1) “[t]he application of human dignity in judicial decisions should be 
based on a written law”; 
(2) “[j]udges should try to define what human dignity is and be 
explicit about its meaning”; 
(3) “[j]udges should attempt to use human dignity consistently in the 
same rulings and in future decisions”; 
(4) “[h]uman dignity should advance human rights rather than limit 
them.”158 
Citing to the CRPD can alleviate some of the ambiguity that arises 
when concepts of dignity are raised in judicial decisions.159 By 
employing these principles, court proceedings are more likely to 
have beneficial outcomes leading to a rejection of sanist attitudes. 
C. Controversial Aspects of the CRPD 
This is not to say that the CRPD is without controversy, 
even in the disability rights community. By way of example, does 
Article 14(1)(b)’s requirement that those with disabilities “are 
not deprived of their liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily”160 protect 
against all institutionalization,161 or, in some circumstances, is 
involuntary hospitalization permissible if an individual poses a 
serious risk of harm to himself or others?162 Is the High 
 
Rosenbaum, supra note 153, at 23, we reject that interpretation. See Perlin & Weinstein, 
But You Have No Choice, supra note 74, at 79 (explaining why adherence to therapeutic 
jurisprudence “is further demanded as a matter of dignity”). 
 158 Doron Shultziner, Human Dignity in Judicial Decisions: Principles of 
Application and the Rule of Law, 25 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 435, 448–49 (2017). 
 159 See Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “She’s Nobody’s Child/The Law 
Can’t Touch Her at All”: Seeking to Bring Dignity to Legal Proceedings Involving 
Juveniles, 56 FAM. CT. REV. 79, 79 n.6 (2018) (alterations in original): 
The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that all persons possessed dignity by 
virtue of their basic humanity, at least since McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 
332, 343 (1943) (“[a] democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all 
men is central, naturally guards against the misuse of the law enforcement 
process”), and continues to write about it to this day; see, e.g., Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (finding “[fundamental] liberties extend to 
certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including 
intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”). 
 160 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 14 (1)(a). 
 161 See Vandana Peterson, Understanding Disability Under the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Its Impact on International Refugee and 
Asylum Law, 42 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 687, 697 (2014). 
 162 Rebecca Zarett, To Work and to Love: How International Human Rights Law Can 
Be Used to Improve Mental Health in the United States, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 191, 208 (2016); 
see, e.g., Sascha Mira Callaghan & Christopher Ryan, Is There a Future for Involuntary 
Treatment in Rights-Based Mental Health Law?, 21 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 747, 747 (2014) 
(arguing that the CRPD does allow for involuntary treatment in some instances, and that 
“failing to account for it in law will jeopardise rights more than it protects them”). 
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Commissioner’s conclusion that, “[i]n the area of criminal law, 
recognition of the legal capacity of persons with disabilities 
requires abolishing a defense based on the negation of criminal 
responsibility because of the existence of a mental or intellectual 
disability,”163 or does the CRPD demand the retention of the 
insanity defense?164 These and other like questions reflect the 
complexity of the issues raised by this CRPD.165 
A controversial topic regarding the CRPD—one related to 
both sanism and therapeutic jurisprudence principles166—is 
whether Article 12 completely abolishes guardianships.167 
Article 12 of the CRPD guarantees that persons with disabilities 
have the right to recognition everywhere before the law.168 The 
International Disability Alliance, a network of global and 
regional organizations of persons with disabilities, has argued 
that, under the CRPD, the following must be abolished: 
(1) “plenary guardianship”; (2) “unlimited time frames for exercise of 
guardianship”; (3) “the legal status of guardianship as permitting any person 
to override the decisions of another”; (4) “any individual guardianship 
arrangement upon a person’s request to be released from it”; (5) “any 
substituted decision-making mechanism that overrides a person’s own will, 
whether it is concerned with a single or a long-term arrangement”; and (6) “any 
other substituted decision-making mechanisms, unless the person does not 
object, and there is a concomitant requirement to establish supports in a 
person’s life so they can eventually exercise full legal capacity”.169 
Whether or not Article 12 definitively abolishes guardianship, 
Article 12(3) reflects “the critical insight that even people with the 
most significant disabilities have legal capacity and are covered by 
the CRPD.”170 Article 12 ensures measures relating to the exercise of 
capacity must have safeguards that “respect the rights, will and 
preferences of the person, are free of conflicts of interest and undue 
influence, are proportional and tailored to the person’s 
circumstances, apply for the shortest time possible and are subject 
to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial 
 
 163 Human Rights Council, Annual Report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and 
the Secretary-General, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/48 (Jan. 26, 2009). 
 164 See Perlin, God Said, supra note 8, at 518. 
 165 See, e.g., Perlin & Szeli, supra note 24, at 251. 
 166 See infra Part IV, for a full discussion of the meaning of therapeutic 
jurisprudence in this context. 
 167 See INT’L DISABILITY ALL., PRINCIPLES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF CRPD, ARTICLE 
12, at ¶ 17 (2013), http://www.internationaldisabilityalliance.org/resources/article-12-legal-
capacity-principles-implementation [https://perma.cc/RW8F-Q4T5] [hereinafter IDRA]. On this 
question generally, see Perlin, Striking for the Guardians, supra note 91, at 1173–74. 
 168 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 12. 
 169 IDRA, supra note 167, at ¶ 17. 
 170 Robert D. Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Road from 
Guardianship to Supported Decision-making, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8, 9 (2012). 
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authority or judicial body.”171 “This mandate screams out for a 
universal overhaul of guardianship law and practice.”172 
D. Supported Decision-Making173 
While the issue of the complete abolishment of 
guardianship under the CRPD remains controversial,174 the 
CRPD does mandate that if intervention is necessary, it must 
take the form of supported decision-making rather than 
substituted decision-making.175 As discussed above, Article 12 of 
the CRPD underscores the importance of legal capacity as an 
inalienable right and provides for safeguards to ensure that a 
person’s capacity is not subject to abuse.176 “Instead of 
paternalistic guardianship laws . . . the CRPD’s supported-
decision making model recognizes first, that all people have the 
right to make decisions and choices about their own lives.”177 
Supported decision-making is also reinforced in U.S. law 
under the ADA.178 Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination 
based on disabilities by public entities in their services, programs, 
or activities.179 Guardianships unnecessarily isolate persons with 
psychosocial impairments.180 This unjustified isolation can be 
 
 171 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 12; see also Leslie Salzman, Rethinking 
Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision Making as a Violation of the Integration 
Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157, 161, 
232 n.232 (2010) [hereinafter Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship]. 
 172 Perlin, Striking for the Guardians, supra note 91, at 1190. 
 173 Michael L. Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein, “Said I ‘But You Have No Choice”: Why 
a Lawyer Must Ethically Honor a Client’s Decision About Mental Health Treatment Even if it 
is Not What S/he Would Have Chosen, 15 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 73, 79 (2016). 
 174 See Arlene S. Kanter & Yotam Tolub, The Fight for Personhood, Legal 
Capacity, and Equal Recognition Under Law for People with Disabilities in Israel and 
Beyond, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 557, 559 (2017). 
 175 Id. at 559–60; see also CPRD, supra note 27, at art. 12. 
 176 Robert Dinerstein et al., Emerging International Trends and Practices in 
Guardianship Law for People with Disabilities, 22 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 435, 444 (2016). 
 177 Arlene S. Kanter, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities and Its Implications for the Rights of Elderly People Under 
International Law, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 527, 563 (2009). 
 178 Supported decision making incorporates the least restrictive alternative 
doctrine, and is based on the concept that no one makes decisions in a vacuum. Supported 
decision making can come in many different forms depending on the needs and abilities of the 
individual. It can include health care proxies, powers of attorney, or contract agreements. See 
generally Supported Decision Making N.Y., What is Supported Decision-Making?, SDMNY, 
https://sdmny.org/about-sdmny/about-sdm/ [https://perma.cc/ZA97-3PGU]. 
 179 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006). 
 180 Leslie Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness—A Legal and 
Appropriate Alternative?, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279, 289 (2011) [hereinafter 
Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness]. The social model of disability 
“places the responsibility squarely on society (and not on the individual with a disability) 
to remove the physical and attitudinal barriers that ‘disable’ people with various 
impairments, and prevent them from exercising their rights and fully integrating into 
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viewed as discrimination based on a disability in violation of the 
ADA.181 A declaration of incapacity by any court can lead to 
feelings of helplessness and loss of control, which are detrimental 
to a person’s mental well-being and create feelings of shame and 
humiliation.182 Substituted decision-making can lead to 
unjustified confinement for persons with mental illness.183 When 
attorneys use substituted judgment in making legal decisions for 
their clients, “there are no checks and balances.”184 
Supported decision-making allows individuals with 
limitations to receive support in order to understand relevant 
information and available choices in order to make decisions 
based on their preferences, instead of completely taking away 
their ability to make any decisions.185 It is important to consider 
the context in which individuals face decisions and not just the 
personal characteristics of the individual with a disability.186 
Education and training are also important for all parties 
involved in supported decision-making, including attorneys, 
judges, clients, and state parties.187 Again, the extent to which 
the ratification of the CRPD actually affects our history of 
stigmatization and marginalization will, in many ways, be the 
bellwether of the CRPD’s actual success. We turn now to the 
school of legal thought known as therapeutic jurisprudence as a 
lens through which we will examine all the relevant issues. 
IV. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE188 
One of the most important legal theoretical developments 
of the past three decades has been the creation and dynamic 
 
society.” Arlene S. Kanter, The Law: What’s Disability Studies Got to Do With It or an 
Introduction to Disability Legal Studies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403, 427 (2011). 
 181 Kevin M. Cremin, Challenges to Institutionalization: The Definition of 
“Institution” and the Future of Olmstead Litigation, 17 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 143, 152 (2012). 
 182 Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship, supra note 172, at 169, 184; see also 
Perlin & Weinstein, Friend to the Martyr, supra note 18, at 38. 
 183 Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness, supra note 180, at 290. 
 184 Josephine Ross, Autonomy Versus a Client’s Best Interests: The Defense Lawyer’s 
Dilemma When Mentally Ill Clients Seek to Control Their Defense, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1343, 
1372 (1998). See generally Perlin & Weinstein, But You Have No Choice, supra note 74. 
 185 Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness, supra note 180, at 306. 
 186 Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to 
Guardianship?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1111, 1153 (2013). 
 187 Id. 
 188 This section is generally adapted from Perlin & Lynch, Sexless Patients, 
supra note 19; Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “In the Wasteland of Your Mind”: 
Criminology, Scientific Discoveries and the Criminal Process, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 304 (2016); 
and Perlin & Weinstein, Friend to the Martyr, supra note 18. Further, it distills the work 
of one of the authors over the past twenty-five years, beginning with Michael L. Perlin, 
What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993). For full 
historical discussions see generally Michael L. Perlin, “Have You Seen Dignity?:” The 
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growth of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ).189 Initially employed in 
cases involving individuals with mental disabilities, but 
subsequently expanded far beyond that narrow area, therapeutic 
jurisprudence presents a new model for assessing the impact of 
case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent, 
the law can have therapeutic or anti‐therapeutic consequences.190 
The ultimate aim of therapeutic jurisprudence is to determine 
whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should 
be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not 
subordinating due process principles.191 
Therapeutic jurisprudence “asks us to look at law as it 
actually impacts people’s lives”192 and focuses on the law’s 
influence on emotional life and psychological well-being.193 It 
suggests that “law should value psychological health, should 
strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences 
whenever possible, and, when consistent with other values 
served by law, should attempt to bring about healing and 
wellness.”194 By way of example, therapeutic jurisprudence “aims 
to offer social science evidence that limits the use of the 
incompetency label by narrowly defining its use and minimizing 
its psychological and social disadvantage.”195 In recent years, 
scholars have considered a vast range of topics through a 
therapeutic jurisprudence lens, including, but not limited to, all 
aspects of mental disability law, domestic relations law, criminal 
 
Story of the Development of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 27 N.Z. U. L. REV. 1135 (2017); 
Michael L. Perlin, “Changing of the Guards:” David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 
and the Transformation of Legal Scholarship, 63 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 3 (2019). 
 189 See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A 
THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A 
THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996); 
BRUCE .J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL (2005). 
See generally David B. Wexler, Mental Health Law and the Seeds of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, in THE ROOTS OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 
78 (Thomas Grisso & Stanley Brodsky eds., 2018); David B. Wexler, Two Decades of 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17 (2008). 
 190 For a transnational perspective, see Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, Mental 
Health Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in DISPUTES AND DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAW 
91 (Ian Freckelton & Kerry Peterson eds., 2006). 
 191 See, e.g., Perlin, They Keep It All Hid, supra note 4, at 875; Perlin, Best 
Friend, supra note 8, at 751; Perlin, Making Love, supra note 8, at 510 n.139. 
 192 Bruce J. Winick, Forward: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on 
Dealing with Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009). 
 193 David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psychological Soft 
Spots and Strategies, in DENNIS P. STOLLE ET AL., PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45 (2000). 
 194 Bruce Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in 
INVOLUNTARY DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds. 2003). 
 195 Claire B. Steinberger, Persistence and Change in the Life of the Law: Can 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Make a Difference?, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 65 (2003). 
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law and procedure, employment law, gay rights law, and tort 
law.196 As Ian Freckelton has noted, “[I]t is a tool for gaining a 
new and distinctive perspective utilizing socio-psychological 
insights into the law and its applications.”197 
TJ is also part of a growing comprehensive movement in 
the law towards establishing more humane and psychologically 
optimal ways of handling legal issues collaboratively, creatively, 
and respectfully.198 These alternative approaches optimize the 
psychological well-being of individuals, relationships, and 
communities dealing with a legal matter, and acknowledge 
concerns beyond strict legal rights, duties, and obligations. In its 
aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance rights, and 
promote well-being, therapeutic jurisprudence has been 
described as “a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of 
law . . . a movement towards a more distinctly relational 
approach to the practice of law . . . which emphasises 
psychological wellness over adversarial triumphalism.”199 That 
is, “[therapeutic jurisprudence] supports an ethic of care.”200 
One of the central principles of therapeutic jurisprudence is 
a commitment to dignity. Professor Amy Ronner describes the “three 
Vs: voice, validation and voluntary participation,”201 arguing: 
What “the three Vs” commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a 
sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that 
litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and 
taken seriously the litigant’s story, the litigant feels a sense of 
validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a 
sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. 
Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in 
which the litigant experiences the proceeding as less coercive. 
Specifically, the feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily 
partook in the very process that engendered the end result or the very 
 
 196 See, e.g., Perlin, Things Have Changed, supra note 8, at 543–45; see also 
Roberto P. Aponte Toro, Sanity in International Relations: An Experience in Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 659, 660–61 (1999) (on its potential 
application to international law issues in general). 
 197 Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: 
The Price and Risks of Influence, 30 THOMAS JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 576 (2008). 
 198 Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence Within The 
Comprehensive Law Movement, in STOLLE, supra note 193, at 465. 
 199 Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical 
Framework, 8 J.L. & MED. 328, 329–30 (2001). 
 200 Michael Perlin, “I’ve Got My Mind Made Up”: How Judicial Teleology in 
Cases Involving Biologically Based Evidence Violates Therapeutic Jurisprudence 27 
(unpublished manuscript) (Mar. 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2930061 [https://
perma.cc/3R72-DN24] (citing Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law 
Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605–07 (2006)). 
 201 Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education 
and Therapeutic Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REV. 
601, 627 (2008). 
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judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives can initiate healing 
and bring about improved behavior in the future. In general, human 
beings prosper when they feel that they are making, or at least 
participating in, their own decisions. 202 
TJ principles frequently converge with many of the principles 
underlying international human rights protections for those 
with mental disabilities, such as the protection of liberty against 
arbitrary deprivation and a commitment to procedural 
fairness,203 and a need for robust counsel.204 As stated earlier, the 
CRPD declares a right to “[f]reedom from . . . degrading 
treatment or punishment,”205 and a “[r]espect for inherent 
dignity.”206 It promotes “awareness throughout society, including 
at the family level, regarding persons with disabilities, and to foster 
respect for the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities.”207 An 
understanding of dignity is absolutely central to an understanding 
of the intersection between international human rights and mental 
disability law.208 TJ can provide insights on how international 
human rights principles should be applied “to achieve therapeutic 
aims and avoid antitherapeutic effects.”209  
The “three Vs” articulated by Professor Ronner are all 
critical aspects of the ways that TJ meshes with the CRPD. If 
the CRPD is truly followed, persons with mental disabilities 
will—finally—have a voice and be validated. And it is far more 
likely that they will act voluntarily and not under the 
compulsion of others. 
We believe that TJ has the best capacity to rid the law of 
sanism and pretextuality.210 Elsewhere, in a book-length treatment 
of the insanity defense, one of the co-authors has written: 
 
 202 Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94–95 (2002); 
see generally AMY D. RONNER, LAW, LITERATURE AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 23 
(2010) (discussing the “three V’s”). 
 203 See Winick, supra note 24, at 543. 
 204 See Juan Ramirez, Jr. & Amy D. Ronner, Voiceless Billy Budd: Melville’s 
Tribute to the Sixth Amendment, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 103, 119 (2004) (characterizing the 
right to counsel as “the core of therapeutic jurisprudence”). 
 205 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 15; see also Charles R. Beitz, Human Dignity 
in the Theory of Human Rights: Nothing but a Phrase?, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 259, 
289 (2013) (discussing the relationship between human dignity and the “importance 
of . . . specific protections . . . such as the prohibition of torture and cruel or degrading 
treatment [in international human rights treaties and conventions]”). 
 206 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 3. 
 207 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 8. 
 208 Beitz, supra note 205, at 281 (noting that a special class of “dignitary harms” 
denies individuals “the capacity for dignified conduct”). 
 209 Winick, supra note 24, at 544. 
 210 In the specific context of criminal law and procedure, on this question, see 
Michael L. Perlin, “Infinity Goes up on Trial”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and the Representation 
of Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 16 QUT L. REV. 106, 107–08 (2016). 
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[W]e must rigorously apply therapeutic jurisprudence principles to each 
aspect of the insanity defense. We need to take what we learn from 
therapeutic jurisprudence to strip away sanist behavior, pretextual 
reasoning and teleological decision making from the insanity defense 
process. This would enable us to confront the pretextual use of social 
science data in an open and meaningful way.211 
We believe the same principles apply to the subject matter of 
this article as well. We believe that the adoption of TJ principles 
will best reflect the “ethic of care” that has been tragically 
missing from the ways that persons with mental disabilities 
have been treated, domestically and internationally. 
Janet Lord and her colleagues focused on the significance of 
“voice accountability” in the drafting of the CRPD.212 One of the co-
authors has previously written that “[t]he CRPD is a document 
that resonates with TJ values,”213 and we believe that remains true. 
The CRPD empowers persons with mental disabilities, and “one of 
the major aims of TJ is explicitly the empowerment of those whose 
lives are regulated by the legal system.”214 The application of TJ, by 
promoting dignity and ensuring therapeutic effects in the 
implementation of the CRPD, and by mandating “voice,”215 
enhances the likelihood that sanism will be eradicated,216 and that 
the “silenced” voices will finally, if tardily, be heard.217 
 
 211 PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE, supra note 57, at 
443; see also Perlin, They Keep It All Hid, supra note 4, at 876: 
To teach mental disability law meaningfully, it is necessary to teach about the 
core characteristics that contaminate it (sanism and pretextuality), to teach 
about the cognitive approaches that distort it (false [ordinary common sense] 
and cognitive-simplifying heuristics), and to teach the school of jurisprudence 
that can optimally redeem it (TJ). 
 212 Lord et al., supra note 94, at 567. On the role of “voice” in other similar UN 
Conventions, see Aisling Parkes, Tokenism Versus Genuine Participation: Children’s 
Parliaments and the Right of the Child to be Heard Under International Law, 16 
WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 1, 16 (2008) (discussing how children’s “voices 
are all too often frequently overlooked and undervalued”). 
 213 Michael L. Perlin, Promoting Social Change in Asia and the Pacific: The 
Need for a Disability Rights Tribunal to Give Life to the U.N. Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 36 (2012) [hereinafter Perlin, 
Promoting Social Change]. 
 214 Id. 
 215 See Ronner, supra note 202, at 94–95. 
 216 See Perlin & Lynch, Mr. Bad Example, supra note 8, at 320. 
 217 Again, these attitudes are not limited to those teaching or practicing law in 
the US. For a Canadian perspective, see Nathalie Des Rosiers, From Québec Veto to Québec 
Secession: The Evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada on Québec-Canada Disputes, 13 
CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 171, 174–75 (2000) (“One can find in the Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
literature several references to the need for the tribunal to listen fully to all the concerns 
of the participants, and to recognize the value of such expression.”); see also Frank Sirotich, 
Reconfiguring Crime Control and Criminal Justice: Governmentality and Problem-Solving 
Courts, 55 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 11 (2006); Timothy T. Culbert, Mental Health Law 
Reform for a New Government in New Brunswick, 62 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 173 (2011). 
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The CRPD and TJ principles are further entwined as 
evidenced by the fact that the CRPD embraces the importance 
of effective counsel for persons with disabilities, the right to 
refuse treatment, and the protection of persons with disabilities 
who are institutionalized.218 TJ and the CRPD are of vital 
importance in order to promote, protect, and enforce the rights 
of persons with mental disabilities.219 The CRPD, in honoring a 
person’s dignity, ensures a more beneficial therapeutic process, 
improved outcomes, and more effective exercise of state power, 
when that power need be exercised.220 
Writing previously about the CRPD and the guardianship 
system prevalent in many civil law nations, one of the co-authors 
said: “I believe that, if we embrace TJ, and the precepts of 
procedural justice, we will have taken an important step towards 
meaningfully enforcing the CRPD in ways that, for the first time, 
will bring both due process and dignity to the guardianship 
system.”221 Similarly, the CRPD will bring dignity and due 
process to the entire mental disability law system.222 Almost 
twenty years ago, the Florida Supreme Court recognized the 
value of therapeutic jurisprudence in juvenile commitment 
hearings.223 We believe that this approach would similarly  
 218 Mehgan Gallagher, No Means No, or Does It? A Comparative Study of the Right 
to Refuse Treatment in a Psychiatric Institution, 44 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 137, 144–46 (2016). 
 219 Id. at 148. 
 220 Simon & Rosenbaum, supra note 153, at 48. 
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hearings are likely to be particularly sensitive to issues of participation, 
dignity and trust. According to Judge Wren and Professor Winick, “[c]ivil 
commitment hearings for juveniles that deny them the ability to articulate 
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invigorate international human rights law as it applies to 
questions that affect persons with mental disabilities. 
CONCLUSION 
The CRPD, at base, is a document that seeks to eradicate 
and eviscerate “stigmas and stereotypes,”224 one that emphasizes 
and “upholds the social inclusion [and] anti-stigma . . . agenda.”225 
Its purpose is to “combat stereotypes, prejudices and harmful 
practices relating to persons with disabilities.”226 It is also a 
document that demands law reform at the local and national level 
all over the world,227 whether in the United States or in the tiny 
island nation of Vanuatu.228 Although much of its framework was 
inspired by the principles and concepts in the ADA,229 the CRPD 
goes far beyond the ADA in its positive mandates, its focus on 
stigma and prejudice, its uncompromising adoption of the social 
model, its reporting requirements, and its identification of the 
specific steps that States must take to ensure an environment for 
the enjoyment of human rights (such as “awareness-raising, 
ensuring accessibility, ensuring protection and safety in situations 
of risk and humanitarian emergencies, promoting access to justice, 
 
their wishes through counsel, but which solely use guardians ad litem to 
present the guardian’s views of the juvenile’s best interests, will not fulfill the 
juvenile’s participatory or dignitary interests.” 
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represented by counsel furthers their therapeutic interests and is 
psychologically beneficial for these children. The Florida Supreme Court 
agreed with and adopted this argument in the three decisions that it rendered 
on the due process rights of foster children facing involuntary commitment to 
these facilities. See M.W. v. Davis & DCF, 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000); see also 
Amendment to Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.350, 804 So. 2d 
1206 (Fla. 2001); Amendment to Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Fla. R. Juv. P. 
8.350, 842 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2003). 
 224 Janet E. Lord & Michael Ashley Stein, The Domestic Incorporation of 
Human Rights Law and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, 83 WASH. L. REV. 449, 475 (2008). 
 225 Fennel, supra note 129, at 107. 
 226 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 8. 
 227 On the law reform obligations of the CRPD, see Lord & Stein, supra note 224, at 471. 
 228 See Paul Harpur & Richard Bales, The Positive Impact of the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A Case Study on the South Pacific and Lessons 
from the U.S. Experience, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 363, 364 (2010) (making this comparison). 
 229 See Janet Lord, The U.N. Disability Convention: Creating Opportunities for 
Participation, BUSINESS L. TODAY, May/June 2010, at 23, 24. 
2019] VOICES IN THE NIGHT 907 
ensuring personal mobility, enabling habilitation and 
rehabilitation, and collecting statistics and data”).230 It also—
perhaps most importantly—makes visible what has long been 
“invisible to the world’s political, social and economic process,”231 
and reflects the reality that “only positive state action can combat 
the deeply entrenched patterns of disability disadvantage arising 
from stigma, devaluation, stereotyping and exclusion.”232 
Mary Donnelly was precisely accurate when she argued 
that “the goal of [mental disability] law reform must include 
delivery on the rights . . . to dignity.”233 The CRPD has the capacity 
to do this, but only if signatory nations grasp the extent to which 
sanism has pervaded all mental disability law policy and 
enforcement over the centuries. The application of TJ principles 
will, finally, allow us to see this and to, we hope, make this truly 
the “dawn of a new era.”234 And maybe then, also, finally, in Dylan’s 
words, the “voices in the night”235 will, for once, be heard. 
 
 230 See PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 147. 
 231 Peter Blanck, “The Right to Live in the World”: Disability Yesterday, Today, 
and Tomorrow, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 367, 401 (2008); on the invisibility of persons with 
disabilities in this context in general, see PERLIN, supra note 6. 
 232 Ena Chadha & C. Tess Sheldon, Promoting Equality: Economic and Social 
Rights for Persons with Disabilities Under Section 15, 16 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 27, 42 (2004). 
 233 Mary Donnelly, From Autonomy to Dignity: Treatment for Mental Disorders 
and the Focus for Patient Rights, 26 L. CONTEXT 37, 57 (2008). 
 234 Perlin, A Change is Gonna Come, supra note 25, at 498. 
 235 Million Miles, Bob Dylan (1997), http://www.bobdylan.com/songs/million-
miles [http://perma.cc/Z7RS-DS9K]. 
